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Liberal Construction and Severe Sentencing Help
RICO Achieve Its Legislative Goals
INTRODUCTION
2
The sentencing of an organized crime member' or racketeer
presents unique problems to the justice system. The most obvious
problem is that traditional modes of sentencing, fine and imprisonment, have been unsuccessful in checking the growth of organized
crime.' The sentencing of an organized crime member is the sen-

1. An organized crime member is one who participates in organized crime. The standard
criminological definition of organized crime was articulated by Sellin: "Organized crime is
an economic enterprise organized for the purpose of conducting illegal activities." Sellin,
Organized Crime: A Business Enterprise, 347 ANNALS 10, 11 (1963).
A structural definition of organized crime was advanced by Cressey: "[Organized crime
relates to] any crime committed by a person occupying, in an established division of labor, a
position designed for the commission of crime, providing that such a division of labor also
includes at least one position for corrupter." D. CRESSEY, CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION: ITS ELEMENrARY FORMS 27 (1972).
For a comprehensive background of the histor6 of organized crime in the United States,
see A. BEQUAI, ORGANIZED CRIME - THE FIFTH ESTATE (1979).
2. A racketeer is one who participates in rackets. A fine distinction exists between an
organized crime member and a racketeer. Whereas organized crime is defined in terms of
social structure, see supra note 1, racket is defined in terms of an activity. Rackets describe
"those types of operational organizations dedicated solely to the production of crime, such
as, a gambling enterprise, a drug distribution network, a loan sharking enterprise, a hijacking organization and a high-level 'crime holding company' like a crime syndicate type
organization, which controls a number of enterprises of this nature." IIT RSES RCH INSTITUTE AND THE CHICAGO CRIME COMM'N, A STUDY OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN ILLINOIS 290 (1971).
The concepts of rackets and organized crime are enmeshed and will be used interchangeably
for the purpose of this note.
3. In April of 1969, President Nixon delivered his "Message on Organized Crime" to
Congress. He observed that "[Although] many of the nation's most notorious racketeers
have been imprisoned or deported and many local organized crime business operations have
been eliminated. . . these successes have not substantially impeded the growth and power
of organized 'crime syndicates ....
They are more firmly entrenched and more secure than
ever before." H.R. Doc. No. 105, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969), reprinted in 116 CONG. REC.
585 (1970). During the Senate debates prior to the enactment of RICO, see infra note 7,
Senator Byrd remarked that:
While prosecutions and convictions of leaders of organized crime and their confederates are increasing each year. . . it is becoming increasingly apparent that such
convictions alone, which simply remove the leaders from control of syndicateowned enterprises but do not attack the vested property interests whose control
passes on to other Costra Nostra leaders, are not adequate to demolish the structure of the surviving organizations which they run.
116 CONG. REc. 607 (1970).
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tencing of a mere cog in an often large and sophisticated criminal
enterprise. Although members of the enterprise may be brought to
justice from time to time, there are always others ready to carry on

the shared illegal activities.4
During the late 1960's, Congress recognized that any remedial
plan to cope with a growing organized crime problem must no

longer focus on sanctioning the individual defendant but must address sanctioning the criminal enterprise as a whole.5 Such a plan
was embarked upon through the passage of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970.6 Title IX of the Act,7 popularly known as the

4. "Like any large corporation, the [criminal] organization functions regardless of personnel changes, and no individual - not even the leader - is indispensable. If he dies or goes
to jail, business goes on." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPOT. ORGANIZED CRE 7 (1967).
See also the presentation of Senator McClellan in the debates on S. 30, 116 CONG. REC.
591 (1970). S. 30 was subsequently enacted as the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. See
infra note 6.
5. What is needed here, the [Judiciary] Committee believes, are new approaches
that will deal not only with individuals but also with the economical base through
which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic
power itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts.
S. Rap. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Seas. 79 (1969). See also the remarks of Senator McClellan
in 116 CONG. RPc. 591 (1970): "Experience has shown that it is insufficient to merely remove
and imprison individual mob members."
6. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970]. On October 15, 1970, S. 30, a comprehensive organized crime control bill sponsored by Senators McClellan and Hruska was enacted into law. The purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was to "seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to
deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." See Statement of
Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. 922, 923, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEws 1073.
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 consists of thirteen separate titles which amend
various sections of the United States Code. These titles are: Title I - Special Grand Jury, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3331-3334, 84 Stat. 923; Title H - General Immunity, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005, 84
Stat. 926; Title III - Recalcitrant Witnesses, 28 U.S.C. § 1826, 84 Stat. 932; Title IV - False
Declarations, 18 U.S.C. § 1623, 84 Stat. 932; Title V - Protected Facilities for Housing Government Witnesses, 84 Stat. 933; Title VI - Depositions, 18 U.S.C. § 3503, 84 Stat. 934; Title
VII - Litigation Concerning Sources of Evidence, 18 U.S.C. § 3504, 84 Stat. 935; Title VIII Syndicated Gambling, 18 U.S.C. § 1511, 84 Stat. 936; 18 U.S.C. § 1955, 84 Stat. 937; Title IX
- Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, 84 Stat. 941;
Title X - Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-3578, 84 Stat. 948; Title
XI - Regulation of Explosives, 18 U.S.C. §§ 841-848,84 Stat. 952; Title XII - National Commission on Individual Rights, 84 Stat. 960; Title XIII - General Provisions (separability), 84
Stat. 962.
7. Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 941 (1970). Title IX amended title 18 of the
United States Code to add chapter 96, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, entitled Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations [hereinafter cited as RICO].
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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act or RICO, attempted to provide new remedies and enhanced sanctions for those
convicted of racketeering.8
One new remedy introduced by RICO is the provision requiring
a defendant to forfeit "any interest he has acquired or maintained"
in violation of the Act. The drafters of RICO hoped that this forfeiture provision would pierce the economic stronghold of organized crime by confiscating its illegally obtained capital. 10 Through
the forfeiture provision, RICO attempts to sanction the entire
criminal enterprise rather than merely the defendants who are being prosecuted."
RICO also provides a prison sentence of up to twenty years for
either violating or conspiring to violate the Act."' Consecutive sentencing,18 justified under the Act as providing an enhanced sanction, is permissible where a defendant is convicted of both offenses. 14' In addition, consecutive sentencing between the RICO
The eight sections of RICO are: J 1961 - Definitions; § 1962 - Prohibited racketeering
activities; § 1963 - Criminal penalties; § 1964 - Civil remedies; § 1965 - Venue and process; §
1966 - Expedition of action; § 1967 - Evidence; § 1968 - Civil investigative demand.
8. The general purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, of which RICO is
title IX, is to provide new remedies and enhanced sanctions for racketeers. See supra note
6.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (1976). "Under the criminal forfeiture provision of section 1963
• . .the proceeding is in personam against the defendant who is the party to be punished
upon conviction of violation of any provision of the section, not only by fine and/or imprisonment, but also by forfeiture of all interest in the enterprise." United States v. Brigance,
472 F. Supp. 1177, 1181 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (citations omitted).
10. See the remarks of Senator McClellan during the Senate debate on S. 30:
"Title IX attacks the problem by providing a means of wholesale removal of organized crime from our organizations, prevention of their return and, where possible, forfeiture of their il-gotten gains. Title IX uses three primary devices to
achieve these ends - criminalforfeiture, civil remedies ... and a number of civil
investigative procedures." (emphasis added).
116 CONG. REc. 591 (1970).
11. "[Tlitle IX. . . will deal not only with individuals but also with the economic base
through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being
of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself
." Remarks of Rep. Poff, 166 CONG. Rc. 35193 (1968).
12. See infra text accompanying note 56.
13. Consecutive sentencing is the imposition by a judge of two or more sentences which
are to be served one after the other, or cumulatively. In contrast, concurrent sentencing is
the imposition of two or more sente nces which are to be served simultaneously; in effect, the
smaller sentences merge into the largest sentence and only the latter is served. See State v.
Rider, 201 La. 733, 10 So. 2d 601, 605 (1942).
14. See generally United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Hawkins, 516 F. Supp. 1204 (M.D. Ga. 1981). But see United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d
1001 (6th Cir. 1980). See also infra text accompanying notes 109 & 112-15.
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offenses and the underlying state and federal offenses which generate the RICO charge is also permissible.15
Given the severe sanctions of RICO, debate has flared over the
proper scope of the Act.1 On one side are those who believe the
Act is applicable only to the ferreting out of organized crime from
legitimate business. On the other are those who believe RICO
should be used to prosecute any and all racketeers in either legitimate or wholly illegitimate businesses. In United States v.
Turkette,"' the Supreme Court agreed with the latter interpretation when it held that RICO encompassed racketeering in both legitimate and wholly illegitimate enterprises.1 8 The liberal construction of RICO in Turkette supports Congress' plan to use the Act as
a weapon to vigorously prosecute and convict organized criminals
in order to mete out the Act's enhanced and innovative sanctions.
This note will develop the theme of broad construction, as articulated in Turkette, as a backdrop to a discussion of the sanctions provided by RICO. First, the key provision of forfeiture will
be examined. Specifically, two issues will be raised: 1) whether forfeiture should be mandatory or discretionary and 2) whether the
proper scope of forfeiture extends to the profits of an illegal enterprise or should be limited to an interest or investment in an enterprise. Second, the ability of the sentencing court to issue consecu15. United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Boylan, 620
F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 946 (1980). See infra notes 106 & 124 and accompanying text for further
discussion.
16. The proponents of a narrowly construed RICO statute are in the minority. Arguments favoring such a position are found in: Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and the Courts:
An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. Rzy. 837 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Bradley]; Note, U.S.
v. Sutton and the Scope of Title IX of the Organized Crime ControlAct of 1970: the Sixth
Circuit's Narrow Interpretationof the Meaning of "Enterprise," 68 Ky. L.J. 469, 485-87
(1980); Note, RICO: An Analysis of the Confusion in Its Application and a Proposalfor
Reform. 33 VAND. L. Rzv. 441, 476-80 (1980).
The viewpoint advocating a broadly construed statute may be found in: Blakey & Gettings, RICO: Evening Up the Odds, Tmz, Oct. 1980, at 58 (Prof. Blakey was on the staff of
the Subcommittee on Criminal Law and Procedure which advised the Senate Judiciary
Committee on the drafting of RICO); Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66
CoRNsa L. Rav. 167 (1980); Note, RICO: Are the Courts Construing the Legislative History Rather Than the Statute Itself?, 55 NoTRz DA.u LAW 777, 792-95 (1980).
17. 452 U.S. 576 (1981). In anticipation of Turkette, the Justice Department regarded a
Supreme. Court reversal as critical to the future effective use of the RICO statute. See
Mitchell, The Trouble with RICO, PoLics, May 1981, at 42 [hereinafter cited as Mitchell].
See also infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of
Turkette.
18. 452 U.S. at 593.
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tive sentences will be examined. Finally, this note will discuss the
necessity of a broad RICO statute equipped with severe sanctions,
notwithstanding some of the problems such a scheme might
engender.
BACKGROUND

The RICO Promise
RICO prohibits a person from conducting interstate commercial
transactions which are tainted by racketeering activity."9 Specifically, the Act outlaws: 1) investing in enterprises with income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity; 2) acquiring or maintaining an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity; and 3) working within an enterprise whose
affairs are conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity. 0
Furthermore, the statute prohibits a conspiracy to engage in any of
these activities.2 The drafters of RICO regarded this scheme as "a
novel,. . . most promising and ingenious proposal for crippling organized crime's . . . emergence in the field of legitimate businesses

19. From the legislative history of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, it is clear
that RICO was enacted to curtail organized crime. Thus, it is interesting to note that the
language of the Act does not outlaw organized crime per se. Instead, RICO takes a functional approach by prohibiting the activity (racketeering) on which organized crime thrives.
The reason for this approach may have been the avoidance of constitutional attacks on the
statute. Had Congress named organized crime as the target of RICO, RICO may have been
challenged on equal protection and vagueness grounds, or as a status crime. For a discussion
of the problems involved with attempting to define organized crime in the statute, see Note,
United States v. Sutton: The Sixth Circuit Curbs Abuse of RICO, the FederalRacketeering Enterprise Statute, 28 CLVs. ST. L. Rav. 629, 654 (1979).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976). Section 1962 provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of
an unlawful debt . . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions
of subsection (a), (b) or (c) of this section.
21. 18 U. S. C. § 1962(d) (1976). For text, see supra note 20.
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'
and unions."22
An unusual feature of RICO is that it defines "racketeering activity"23 as the commission of pre-existing state and federal crimes.
Thus,
if a defendant engages in a "pattern of racketeering activ24

ity,"

comprised of the commission of two or more of the pertinent

state or federal crimes, he is subject to sanction under RICO."5
RICO, in essence, is a "super-statute"; it permits the government
to mete out additional sanctions to racketeers for crimes already
punishable under other laws. Given the difficulties the government
already encounters in prosecuting organized crime members, RICO
provides federal prosecutors with a means by which they can
stiffen criminal penalties without having to gather new evidence to
prove the commission of a new offense.
Initially, however, the promise of RICO remained unfulfilled
when the statute lay virtually dormant in the first few years following its enactment. Prior to 1975, only a handful of defendants were
prosecuted under the Act.2 Then, in late 1974, the Seventh Circuit
22. 116 CONG. Rac. 602 (1970). See the remarks of Senator Hruska who proposed the
initial RICO bill as S. 1861. S. 1861 was later incorporated into S. 30. Id.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976) defines "racketeering activity" as:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title
18, United States Code:... [34 sections are listed]; (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on
payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds); or (D) any offense involving bankruptcy, fraud, fraud in
the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous
drugs, punishable under any law of the United States.
Compare this definition with the one offered in note 2 supra.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976) defines "pattern of racketeering activity" as requiring "at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this
chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
25. The issue of whether the two acts of racketeering activity must be interrelated to
constitute a pattern of racketeering has not been resolved. Compare United States v. Elliott,
571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hawkins v. United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978)
(the two acts need not be related) with United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), afl'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976) (the two acts must
be related).
26. See Atkinson, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,18 U.S.C. §§ 196168: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRiM. LAw & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 n.21
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Atkinson]. The following number of RICO cases were reported
for each year.
1970-0
1972- 1
1974 - 3
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decided United States v.Cappetto,27 which marked the beginning
of a steady increase in RICO litigation.2 ' The Cappetto court was
the first to face what was to become a hotly disputed issue:
whether the term "enterprise, ' 29 as defined in section 1961(4) of
RICO, encompassed both legitimate and illegitimate entities or
was restricted solely to the former. 0 The defendants in Cappetto
asserted that RICO had a singular purpose, which was to halt the
influence of racketeering in legitimate business. Consequently, the
defendants claimed that their wholly illegal gambling operation
was not within the reach of the Act. The court sitting in Cappetto,
however, disagreed with the defendants and, citing the broad legislative purpose of RICO, held that an "enterprise" under the Act
encompassed both legitimate and illegitimate entities. 1 Although
Cappetto was a civil remedies action under section 196432 of RICO,
its broad reading of the Act's scope influenced both future civil
and criminal cases.
The Battle over Liberal Construction
Since 1975, the majority of courts that have construed the term

1971 -0

1973 - 2

1975 - 7

Id.
27. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
28. Although the Cappetto decision itself was not instrumental in increasing the number
of RICO prosecutions after 1974, the case was situated at a turning point in the history of
RICO. Cappetto was the harbinger of a new wave of RICO cases which used the Act both
liberally and creatively.
Perhaps the actual reason for the increase in RICO prosecutions was a concerted effort by
the Department of Justice, beginning in 1975, to inform local United States Attorneys on
the use of RICO. Telephone interview with Brian Murtagh, Head of the Organized Crime
Unit in charge of RICO prosecutions, Department of Justice, Washington D.C. (Oct. 28,
1981) [hereinafter cited as Murtagh interview]. See also Atkinson, supra note 26, at 3 n.21.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976). Section 1961(4) defines "enterprise" to include "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."
30. See infra note 33.
31. The court in Cappetto decided that the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime was only one target of Congress in enacting RICO. In addition, the court found
that the influence of organized crime on commerce was a target area. Because Cappetto
involved a gambling operation, the opinion cited legislative history indicating that gambling
was an illegal activity which Congress intended to reach with the Act. 502 F.2d at 1358. But
see criticisms of the Cappetto decision in Bradley, note 16 supra, at 852. For further criticisms, see also Note, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations:The Ninth Circuit
Endorsement of Popular Decision, 10 GOLDEN GATE L. Rzv. 101, 109-10 (1980) and Note,
United States v. Sutton: Reining in on Runaway RICO, 42 U. Prrr. L. Rzv. 131, 141-45
(1980).
32. See infra note 54.
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"enterprise" have followed Cappetto in defining the term broadly
to include legitimate and illegitimate entities.3" The scope of "enterprise" was further broadened by subsequent holdings that the
term encompassed both public and private entities.3" Finally, the
Fifth Circuit offered what is probably the broadest definition when
it referred to an enterprise as "an amoeba-like infra-structure that
35
controls a secret criminal network.
The judiciary's liberal interpretation of "enterprise" helped to
transform RICO into a very broad statute. As a result, prosecutors
routinely began to include RICO counts in any case involving the
violation of two or more of the state and federal laws encompassed
by RICO. By the late 1970's, over 200 RICO prosecutions had been
initiated by the Department of Justice.36 The defendants in these
actions, however, often had nothing to do with what was traditionally thought of as organized crime, the activity RICO was enacted

33. The vast majority of the circuits broadly construed the RICO statute to encompass
both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. See, e.g., United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d
523, 522 n.1 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Swiderski, 593
F.2d 1246, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1090-91 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nor. Napoli v. United States, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). But see
United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 899-900 (1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576 (1981); United
States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d
260, 270 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part, 642 F. 2d 1001 (1980).
34. Various public offices were found to be "enterprises" under RICO. See United States
v. Angeilli, 660 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1981)(New York City Civil Court); United States v. Lee
Stoller Enterprises, Inc., 652 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1981) (office of county sheriff); United
States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1981) (defendant's Senate seat); United States v.
Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981) (Florida's Third Judicial Circuit); United States v.
Clark, 646 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1981) (office of a county judge); United States v. Altomare,
625 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1980) (office of a county prosecuting attorney); United States v.
Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980), (city police department, individual city officers); United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1979)
(Philadelphia Traffic Court); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977) (State
Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes), cert. denied sub nom. Millhouse v. United States,
434 U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Lavin, 504 F. Supp. 1356 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (Bd. of Tax
Appeals); United States v. Sisk, 476 F. Supp. 1061 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (Merrit, J., sitting by
designation) (office of the governor of Tennessee). Contra United States v. Mandel, 415 F.
Supp. 997, 1020-22 (D. Md. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), vacated
on other grounds by an equally divided court, 602 F.2d 653 (1979) (en banc), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 961 (1980) (office of the governor of Maryland is not an "enterprise" because "enterprise" means only private, not public entities). Mandel is the only case holding that "enterprise" includes only private entities. In a subsequent case, United States v. Baker, 617
F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1980), the court disagreed "with the Mandel court's implication that all
public entities are beyond the purview of the (RICO] statute." Id. at 1061.
35. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 898 (5th Cir. 1978).
36. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 41.
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to remedy. The broad scope of the statute had enabled the government to prosecute defendants ranging from a stockbroker who defrauded his clients, 7 to a Japanese cable manufacturing corporation that obtained supply contracts through bribery,38 and to a
Pennsylvania state representative who arranged bribes between
medical school applicants and school officials. 3 ' Even in cases involving organized crime, the racketeering often was not linked to
any tangible enterprise.40
Provoked by what was perceived to be abuse and overreach of
the statute, critics of RICO characterized the statute as "a loose
carronade which threatens to hull entities never contemplated in
its enactment. '4 1 In 1979, this controversy escalated when the
Sixth Circuit held, contrary to precedent, that an enterprise within
the meaning of RICO is an entity organized and "acting solely for a

37. United States v. Pray, 452 F. Supp. 788 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
38. United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980).
39. United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also United States
v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978) (beauty college owner defrauded the Veteran's Administration for veteran's educational benefits); United States v. Dennis, 458 F.
Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (General Motors Corp. employee attempted to collect usurious
debts from fellow employees); and United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y.
1977) (union officials embezzled and converted union funds for their own uses, i.e., an extravagant convention in Florida). For a critical discussion of the broad application of RICO,
see Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor'sNursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 165
(1980).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576
(1981) (drug trafficking); United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1980) (prostitution ring); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979) (home robbery); United
States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Gispert v. United
States, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) (robbery, counterfeiting, murder); United States v. Rone 598
F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979) (murder and extortion); United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748
(5th Cir. 1978), modified on other grounds, 590 F.2d 1379 (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
762 (1979) (narcotics ring); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978) (multiple forms of racketeering).
41. Remarks of James Catterson, Jr. in Fordham Seminar for Corporate Counsel Explores Variety of CriminalIssues, in 26 CRIM. L. Re. (BNA) 2302, 2306 (1980). See generally Atkinson, supra note 26; Bradley, supra note 16; Tarlow, RICO: Someone Loaded the
Dice, TUAL, Feb. 1981, at 54; Note, Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970:
An Analysis of Issues Arising in Its Interpretation,27 DE PAuL L. REv. 89, 105, 112 (1977);
Note, U.S. v. Sutton and the Scope of Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970: the Sixth Circuit's Narrow Interpretationof the Meaning of "Enterprise,"68 Ky. L.
J. 469 (1980); Note, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil
Remedies for "Criminal Activity", 124 U. PA. L. REv. 192, 201-06 (1975); Note, Elliott v.
U.S.: Conspiracy Law and the Judicial Pursuit of Organized Crime Through RICO, 65 U.
VA. L. REv. 109 (1979); Note, The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct: An
Analysis of the Confusion in Its Application and a Proposalfor Reform, 33 VAND. L. REv.
441 (1980). See also infra note 44.
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legitimate purpose.4 Although the Sixth Circuit eventually reversed itself,"' its initial position was later adopted by the First
and Eighth Circuits and garnered support from various dissenting
judges."
Adherents to this more restrictive reading of RICO emphasize
that the legislative history of the Act speaks primarily of eradicating the infiltration of organized crime in legitimate business."
Therefore, even though the express language of the Act is silent on
the legality of the enterprise, the Act should be construed so as to
carry out this limited legislative intent. Furthermore, the argument
was advanced by one court that where a criminal statute is ambiguous, the ambiguity is historically resolved in favor of lenity to4a
ward the defendant.
The controversy in the courts over the scope of RICO was recently resolved by the Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Turkette.47 In Turkette, the Court held that the language of the
statute was unambiguous and provided for both legitimate and illegitimate entities within the definition of "enterprise. ' 48 Justice
White, speaking for a majority of eight, 49 noted that the eradication of organized crime from legitimate business was but one aspect of the legislative intent to rid the entire American economy of

42. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 1001
(6th Cir. 1980).
43. 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980).
44. See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 899-900 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S.
576 (1981) and United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980). See also
United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 311 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980)
(Swygert, J., dissenting); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) (Ely, J., dissenting); United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682,
690-91 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980) (Swygert, J., dissenting); United
States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 107-10 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977) (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
45. See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 900-03 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S.
576 (1981); United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 267-68 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part, 642
F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980). See also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
46. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 269 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part, 642 F.2d
1001 (6th Cir. 1980).
47. 452 U.S. 576 (1981). A thorough discussion of the Turkette decision may be found in
Note, RICO Extended to Apply to Wholly Illegitimate Enterprises - United States v.
Turkette, 101 S.Ct. 2524 (1981), 72 J. CriM. LAw & CRIMINOLOGY 1426, 1428 (1981).
48. The defendants in Turkette were a loose confederation of criminals engaging in
wholly illegitimate activities such as narcotics trafficking and arson. The court of appeals
held that the defendants, although associated in fact, were not an enterprise within the
meaning of RICO. 632 F.2d at 905-06.
49. Mr. Justice Stewart agreed with the reasoning and conclusion of the court of appeals
and filed a statement, dissenting. 452 U.S. at 593.
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the influence of organized crime. 0 He reasoned that a liberal construction of the statute was more congruous with legislative intent
because, under a restrictive interpretation, "[w]hole areas of organized criminal activity would be placed beyond the substantive
reach of the enactment." 51 Moreover, even "[a]ccepting that the
primary purpose of RICO is to cope with the infiltration of legitimate businesses, applying the statute in accordance with its terms,
so as to reach criminal enterprises, would seek to deal with the
problem at its very source." 5
The Supreme Court's strong support of RICO in Turkette may
be perceived as both a vote of confidence and a renewed opportunity to utilize the statute as intended. Whereas confusion may
once have existed regarding the purpose and scope of RICO, the
Supreme Court made clear in Turkette that the purpose of the Act
is to wage war on organized crime operating under the aegis of
both legitimate and illegitimate entities. The legislative purpose
behind RICO, however, is not fulfilled merely upon prosecution
and conviction of the individual organized crime defendant. Indeed, it is not until the defendant is sanctioned that RICO ultimately achieves its goal, which is to curtail effectively the growth
of organized crime.
THE IMPOSITION OF STRICT CRIMINAL SANCTIONS

During the congressional debates prior to the enactment of
RICO, the drafters of the bill emphasized the woeful inadequacy of
traditional criminal sanctions in reducing the level of organized
crime. 5 In response, Congress designed strict and innovative penalties" for RICO in an attempt to meet "the special challenge that
50.

Id. at 587.

51.

Id. at 589.

52. Id. at 591.
53. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
54. The sanctions under RICO provide both criminal penalties (18 U.S.C. § 1963) and
civil remedies (18 U.S.C. § 1964) (1976). The civil remedies, which are not discussed in the
text of this note, were patterned after the antitrust civil remedies of injunction, divestiture,

dissolution and reorganization. These remedies, having been effective in trade regulation,
would hopefully "forge a powerful new weapon for putting the syndicate out of business."
116 CONG. Rac. 607 (1970). But see Note, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "CriminalActivity," 124 U. PA. L. Rxv. 192, 198 (1975)
for a critical analysis of the civil remedies provision. The author observes that a due process
problem arises in a civil action where the defendants are not afforded the constitutional
safeguards granted to defendants in a criminal prosecution for the commission of the same

illegal acts.
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organized crime poses to the well-being of our Nation."se Section
1963(a) of RICO specifies the criminal penalties, which include a
fine, imprisonment, and a provision for forfeiture of property illegally obtained as the result of criminal activity."6 The sanction requiring forfeiture of the defendant's illegally acquired interests was
considered the most controversial 7 and potentially the most effective penalty within the provision.
The Forfeiture Provision
Congress enacted the RICO forfeiture provision as an innovative
means of stopping the growth of organized crime through confiscation of the organization's ill-gotten gains.58 The provision revived
in personam forfeiture in American law, a concept based on the
premise that a convicted criminal should not be permitted to own
property."' Under this common law doctrine, all property, upon

55. Remarks of Senator McClellan during the Senate debates on the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970. 116 CONG. Rac. 585 (1970).
56. Section 1963(a) provides:
Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter [18 U.S.C. § 1962]
shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both, and shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or
maintained in violation of section 1962 [18 U.S.C. § 1962], and (2) any interest in,
security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind affording a
source of influence over, any enterprise which he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962

[18 U.S.C. § 1962].
18 U.S.C. 1963(a) (1976).
57. See Tarlow, Due Process Pays the Price For RICO Forfeiture's High Cost, Nat'l
L.J., June 15, 1981, at 26, col. 1. The author asserts that the RICO forfeiture provision gives
insufficient procedural guidelines for the confiscation of defendant's property and therefore
leads the provision to abuse by prosecutors and to a violation of defendant's constitutional
rights. See also Taylor, Forfeiture Under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 - RICO's Most Powerful
Weapon, 17 Am.CuM.L. Rzv. 379 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Taylor]. The author advocates a narrow construction of the forfeiture provision in light of the constitutional dimensions of "forfeiture of estate."
58. [W]hat is innovative about RICO is not that it imposes forfeiture as a consequence of criminal activity, but rather that it imposes it directly on an individual
as part of a criminal prosecution rather than in a separate proceeding in rem
against the property subject to forfeiture. Statutes providing for in rem forfeiture
of property related to criminal activity are relatively common.
United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979).
59. Forfeitures have been categorized as either in personam or in rem. An in personam
forfeiture is an action directly against the defendant whereby forfeiture occurs as a consequence of the defendant's conviction. In contrast, an in rem forfeiture is a proceeding directly against the property itself and is independent of the owner's crime. For a discussion
of in personam and in rem actions, see generally, Overby v. Gordon, 177 U.S. 214 (1900);
Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185 (1886); and Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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conviction, was surrendered to the Crown." Until RICO, Congress
had regarded in personam forfeiture as a harsh and undesirable
penalty and had prohibited its use by statute." Given the necessity
of a special campaign against organized crime, however, Congress

tempered its position and acceded to the revival of the penalty in
62

RICO.
At the government's prodding, federal prosecutors have attempted to maximize the effectiveness of the forfeiture provision."
In so doing, two issues have arisen regarding its use. The first is
whether the issuance of a forfeiture order is mandatory or discretionary; the second is whether the proper scope of forfeiture extends to the profits of an illegal enterprise or is limited to an interest or investment in an enterprise.

Mandatory Forfeiture
Upon conviction, the in personam forfeiture provision of RICO
requires that the defendant automatically forfeit his illegally obtained interest to the government." The decree of forfeiture is issued by a judge who, in turn, may also sentence the defendant to a
fine and imprisonment as prescribed in section 1963(a) of the

RICO statute. In determining the amount of the fine and the
length of the imprisonment, a judge, by tradition, may exercise
broad discretion." Based on this tradition, it might be reasonable
to assume that a judge may also exercise discretion in ordering a
60. For a historical treatment of the forfeiture provision, see United States v. Grande,
620 F.2d 1026, 1037-39 (4th Cir. 1980). See also United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 813
n.15 (5th Cir. 1980). For a complete discussion of the constitutional dimensions of in personam forfeiture, see Taylor, supra note 57, at 380-82.
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1976). This section is based on Act, Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §
324, 35 Stat. 1151 [formerly 18 U.S.C. § 544 (1940)]. Section 3563 provides: "No conviction
or judgment shall work corruption of blood or any forfeiture of estate."
The inherent unfairness of in personam forfeiture was repugnant to the framers of the
United States Constitution; the prohibition against such forfeiture was incorporated into
American law in 1790. "From that date to the present, therefore, no Federal statute has
provided for a penalty of forfeiture as a punishment for violation of a criminal statute of the
United States. Section 1963(a) [of RICO], therefore, would repeal 18 U.S.C. § 3563 by implication." United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).
62. In describing the proposed racketeering legislation to the House, Rep. Pott (Virginia)
remarked, "As the need, so the remedy must be new.... After conviction, the ill-gotten
gains must be forfeited to the Government. This sanction is not only poetic justice but a
strong deterrent as well." 115 CONG. Rzc. 9951 (1969).
63. See U.S. DEP'T or JuSTIce, CRIMINAL Div., CRIMINAL FoRFEIrruREs UNDmm RICO AND
CONTINUING CRIMINAL ENTPmzuS STATUTES 1 (1980).

64. For the procedural aspects of forfeiture, see infra note 71 and accompanying text.
65. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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forfeiture decree, but another penalty imposed by the court. Section 1963(a) of RICO, however, stipulates that "whoever violates
[the statute] . . . shall forfeit. . . any interest [in the illegal enterprise]."" The unequivocal use of the word "shall" has justified one
court's determination that the statute intended RICO forfeitures
as mandatory penalties.
In United States v. L'Hoste,7 the defendants were convicted of
racketeering in a public bribery scheme involving the procurement
of sewer construction contracts. The government sought forfeiture
of defendant L'Hoste's stock interest in his construction company.
After the jury determined the extent of the forfeitable interest,"
the district court exercised its discretion in refusing to order the
forfeiture. The court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus directing the lower court to order the forfeiture."' In noting that
"[f]orfeiture was viewed as an innovative measure that was necessary to undermine the economic base of those convicted of racketeering activity," the Fifth Circuit relied on the meaning of the
plain language of the statute in holding that forfeiture was
mandatory. 70 The court reasoned that as long as federal prosecutors comply with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
require notice of forfeiture and a special verdict as to the extent of
the illegal interest,7 1 the judge may not, in his discretion, refuse to
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1979) (emphasis added). See supra text accompanying note 56.
67. 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1980).
"
68. In a criminal forfeiture proceeding, under the common law, the defendant was apparently entitled to notice, trial and a special jury finding on the factual issues surrounding
the declaration of forfeiture which followed his criminal conviction. A special verdict for
criminal forfeiture is provided in rule 31(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See
infra note 71.
69. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1980).
70. Id. at 812.
71. After the enactment of the RICO statute in 1970, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were amended to accommodate the new criminal forfeiture laws by providing the
defendant with common law procedural rights.
Rule 7(c)(2) provides the defendant with notice:
Criminal Forfeiture -No judgment of forfeiture may be entered in a criminal proceeding unless the indictment or the information shall allege the extent of the
interest or property subject to forfeiture.
FED. R. Cium. P. 7(c)(2).
Rule 31(e) provides for a special jury finding:
Criminal Forfeiture - If the indictment or the information alleges that an interest
or property is subject to criminal forfeiture, a special verdict shall be returned as
to the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any.
FED.R. Cram. P. 31(e).
In addition, rule 32(b)(2) provides for a judgment authorizing the Attorney General to
seize the interest or property forfeited:
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issue a forfeiture order.
L'Hoste suggests that a judge is simply a conduit through which
a forfeiture is ordered, thereby leaving little, if any, room for discretion. The wide latitude usually accorded judges in sentencing is

based on the premise that sentences should be tailored to the individual and the facts and circumstances surrounding a case,"7 and
judges are understandably reluctant to give up their discretionary
prerogative. As a result, one court, reacting to the L'Hoste decision, has voiced a refusal to relinquish all powers of discretion in
executing the forfeiture clause. 3
Judicial discretion in RICO forfeiture orders is somewhat illusory because, although forfeiture is a part of the penalty imposed
upon a convicted RICO defendant along with fine and imprisonment, forfeiture is technically outside the sentencing function of
the court.74 This is so because in personam forfeitures are automatically activated upon conviction.7 6 If the defendant is convicted
under RICO, therefore, the imposition of the penalty of in personam forfeiture becomes mandatory.
The L'Hoste court's limitation on judicial discretion in the forfeiture provision is essential to effectuating the legislative purpose
of RICO: an attack on the economic base of organized crime by
forcing convicted racketeers to forfeit their illegally acquired forCriminal Forfeiture - When a verdict contains a finding of property subject to a
criminal forfeiture, the judgment of criminal forfeiture shall authorize the Attorney General to seize the interest or property subject to forfeiture, fixing such
terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper.
Fim. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(2).
72. The Supreme Court suggested the desirability of individualized sentences when it
stated:
For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of
more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed and that there
be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character
and propensities of the offender. His past may be taken to indicate his present
purposes and tendencies and significantly to suggest the period of restraint and
the kind of discipline that ought to be imposed upon him.
Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937).
73. See United States v. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189, 191 (D. Md. 1981), where the court
stated "this Court is unable to accept an interpretation of RICO which would preclude any
possibility of the exercise of judicial discretion with regard to a forfeiture under that statutory scheme."
74. See supra notes 9 & 59. The court in United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 813
(5th Cir. 1980) stated, "The... court's sentencing function only relates to fines and imprisonment, and this function is in no way impaired or impeded by the presence of the
mandatory forfeiture provision.
75. See supra note 59.
76. Id.
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tunes. Because of the self-perpetuating nature of organized crime,
Congress believed that forfeiture would more successfully achieve
this purpose than the fines or prison terms often imposed on a defendant.7 7 To this end, Congress deliberately crafted the forfeiture
provision to convey a mandatory penalty. To ignore the plain language of the statute in deference to the traditional policies of sentencing discretion would therefore subvert the legislative intent of
RICO.
The Second Circuit has noted that, under RICO, the forfeiture
penalty is keyed to the size of the criminal enterprise, and therefore the extent of the forfeiture is roughly proportionate to the defendant's crime. 78 It correctly pointed out, however, that in some
situations, a forfeiture order may be so harsh as to violate the
79
eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Where unconscionable results would occur, the court indicated
that a court must have the power to grant the defendant relief.8 0
The difficulties which arise from enforcing a mandatory forfeiture provision in deference to legislative intent, while simultaneously protecting a defendant from draconian forfeiture, may be resolved by reserving to the court the power to modify
disproportionately large forfeitures. Contrary to the trial court's
ruling in L'Hoste, this power would not include the discretion to
set aside entirely a forfeiture order. If the goal of the forfeiture
provision is to be realized, a convicted RICO defendant with forfeitable interests should always be required to forfeit some portion
of his holdings. Under the statute, the forfeitable interest in a

77. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. See also the mandatory language in the
legislative history of the RICO Act: "[RICO] violations shall be punished by forfeiture to
the United States of all property and interests, as broadly described, which are related to
the violations." (emphasis added). P.L. 91-452, § 901 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4033, 4033.
78. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979). In Huber, a New Jersey
attorney and his father ran a hospital supply house. During the course of their business, the
Hubers fraudulently overcharged various hospitals by falsifying invoices. The overcharges
totalled close to one-half million dollars. The Hubers challenged the government's attempt
to compel them to forfeit their interest in their business on both procedural and constitutional grounds. The Second Circuit, however, upheld the forfeiture as proper. Id. at 390-91.
79. Id. at 397.
80. [wihere the forfeiture threatens disporportionately to reach untainted property
of a defendant, for example, if the criminal and legitimate aspects of the "enterprise" have been commingled over time, section 1963 permits the district court a
certain amount of discretion in avoiding draconian (and perhaps potentially unconstitutional) applications of the forfeiture provision.
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racketeering enterprise is inherently scaled to the magnitude of the
defendant's crime;8 1 thus, the initial presumption should be that
the forfeiture is proportionate to the crime. Where a court determines that this presumption has been rebutted, it may modify the
forfeiture order accordingly. By adopting this approach toward
mandatory forfeiture, the government may continue to vigorously
pursue criminal forfeitures in a manner which affords the defendant a measure of protection from inequitable confiscations of his
property.
82
United States v. Marubeni America Corp.

A Restrictive Approach to Forfeiture
Perhaps a more difficult question facing the courts than that of
mandatory forfeiture concerns the scope of the forfeiture provision.
Litigation on this question centers on the definition of "interest"
as it is used in sections 1963(a)(1) and (2).83
In 1980, the Ninth Circuit decided United States v. Marubeni
America Corp.,84 which presented the issue of whether amounts
paid or payable for performance of a contract procured through a
pattern of racketeering activity were forfeitable interests under
RICO. Marubeni Corporation and co-defendant Hitachi Corporation were engaged in the production and sale of electrical cable. By
bribing a telephone utility official, the defendants were able to underbid on and obtain three telephone cable supply contracts. A
grand jury indicted the defendants for numerous offenses including, inter alia, racketeering pursuant to RICO."8 In the indictment,
the government requested the defendants to forfeit all the
amounts paid or payable to them for performance of the supply
contracts. Section 1963(a)(1) of RICO provides that the defendant
shall forfeit "any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962 [prohibited activities]."' 6 The government asserted that "interest" meant "any form of income or proceeds from
87
a 'pattern of racketeering activity'.
The court of appeals disagreed with this interpretation, holding
81.

Id.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980).
See supra note 56.
611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 764.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (1976).

87.

611 F.2d at 766.
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instead that the forfeiture provision "applies to interests 'in an enterprise' illegally acquired or maintained." 8 Hence, the proceeds of
the contracts were not subject to forfeiture. The court based its
holding on three rationales. First, it examined the language of section 1962, the prohibitory section of RICO, for internal consistency. At the heart of 1962(a) and 1962(b) is language prohibiting
the procurement of "any interest in

. .

. any enterprise."89 Section

1962(a) provides, however, for certain exceptions to the general
prohibitory language. For example, the use of illegal income to
make small purchases of securities on the open market where no
control of the issuer is sought is not prohibited by the statute."
Thus, the court reasoned that the forfeiture provision could not
encompass all illegal profits, proceeds, or other income because
section 1962 clearly states that certain uses of illegal income are
not prohibited. 1
Second, the court examined the language of the forfeiture provision itself. The court noted that the forfeiture language does not
mention profits, proceeds, or illegal income, whereas another federal statute, passed by Congress in the same month as RICO, contained a forfeiture provision which expressly provides for the for88. Id. at 769. Accord United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339 (5th Cir, 1981); United
States v. Romano 1209, 523 F. Supp. (S.D. Fla. 1981); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp.
134 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United States v. Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Pa. 1977) But see
United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2020, rev'd,
681 F.2d 952 (en banc) (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that insurance proceeds obtained through
conduct of arson ring are subject to forfeiture); United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84 (9th
Cir. 1982) (holding that commercial real estate purchased with profits derived from racketeering activity is subject to forfeiture).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976). See supra note 20 for pertinent text.
90. The statute provides:
A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issues, or of
assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issues held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family,
and his or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to
one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
91. 611 F.2d at 767. But see a criticism of this "one percent investment exception" rationale in Note, RICO: Are the Courts Construing the Legislative History Rather Than the
Statute Itself?, 55 NoTRz DAME LAW, 777, 784-86 (1980). The author contends that the one
percent investment exception was not intended as a "safe harbor" rule for racketeers, but
was meant to protect the "unnecessary disruption of publicly held legitimate enterprises."
Id. at 786. See also United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d at 960.
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feiture of profits. 92 Certainly, the court posited, Congress would
have provided similar language in the RICO statute had it intended RICO forfeitures to encompass profits and proceeds.
Finally, the Marubeni court construed the legislative history of
RICO and cited numerous examples where Congress has spoken of
"forfeiture of an interest in an enterprise." 93 The court concluded
that, although the language of the statute is silent on the forfeitability of profits, Congress intended that forfeiture apply only to
interests in a racketeering enterprise.
An "interest in an enterprise" has been defined as akin to a proprietary right or a stock ownership in an enterprise.9 4 Finding this
interest, however, has been a difficult task for courts subsequent to
Marubeni.9 5 Although a RICO enterprise may be defined as an in-

92. 611 F.2d at 766. See also infra note 141.
93. 611 F.2d at 767-68, 769 n.11.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456, 461 (W.D. Pa. 1977). In Meyers,
the court indicated that it would be a "strained construction of Section 1963" to classify
"profits or fruits received from the enterprise" as "interest" in the enterprise. The court
reasoned that "the more natural interpretation is that an 'interest' is akin to a continuing
proprietary right in the nature of partnership or stock ownership (or holding a debt or
claim, as distinguished from 'equity' investment) rather than mere dividends or distributed
profits." Id.
95. The following year, the Fifth Circuit confronted the same question in a different
factual setting: whether insurance proceeds reaped from arson for profit are an interest subject to forfeiture under RICO. In United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2020, rev'd, 681 F.2d 952 (en banc) (5th Cir. 1982), the defendants
were a group of individuals associated for the purpose of committing arson. During a three
year period, the group, composed of homeowners, arsonists, an insurance adjuster, promoters and investors, destroyed at least eighteen residential and commercial properties. Insurance proceeds were successfully collected subsequent to each burning and divided among
the co-defendants. 631 F.2d at 953. Following a jury trial, sixteen of the twenty-three defendants were found guilty of RICO violations. The jury then returned a special verdict on the
extent of the property subject to forfeiture under section 1963(a)(1). See supra note 56.
Four defendants were ordered to forfeit the insurance proceeds they received pursuant to
the burning of their properties. On appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed these monetary forfeitures. Finding the reasoning of Marubeni persuasive, the
panel held that the RICO forfeiture provision was intended to reach only interests in an
enterprise and not the profits and proceeds from the racketeering activity.
On August 2, 1982, as this article was going to press, the Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals,
sitting en banc, reversed the panel, reinstating the district court's order of forfeiture. The
court noted that its decision "squarely conflicts with that of the Ninth Circuit." 681 F.2d at
959. The court en banc reached its holding by looking first at the plain language of the
statute. On its face, the forfeiture clause refers to "any interest.., acquired or maintained
in violation of section 1962." 18 U.S.C. 1963(a)(1) (1976) (emphasis added). The court stated
that the language itself does not limit forfeitable interests to those in an enterprise, and that
if a limitation had been the intent of. Congress, such limiting language would have been
expressly provided. 681 F.2d at 954. In addressing the Marubeni court's posture that a restrictive definition of "interest" is supported by the language in section 1962(a) and (b),

1074

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 13

dividual partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity
in which a defendant may have an interest or investment, a RICO
enterprise may also be defined as any union or group of individuals
associated in fact, although not a legal entity.' 6 However, groups of
individuals associated in fact but not legal entities are not structurally amenable to the concepts of ownership or investment. One
cannot have a requisite proprietary interest in a crime ring sufficient for a court to find a forfeitable interest. Consequently, the
profits derived from the racketeering activities of such illegal entities are immune from forfeiture for want of the requisite "interest
in an enterprise."
Although it is unclear whether there were underlying reasons for

which refers to acquiring or maintaining an interest in an enterprise, the Fifth Circuit asserted that these references do not define the type of forfeitable interests, but "merely identif(y) the illegal activities which trigger the forfeiture penalty, supplying the nexus between
the RICO violation and the forfeiture property." Id. at 955.
The court also found support for its broad construction of the forfeiture clause in the
RICO legislative history, which it found "replete with references to this broad 'hit them
where they hurt' philosophy." Id. at 957 n.17. The court acknowledged the existence of
other references in the legislative history which support limiting forfeiture to interests in an
enterprise, but suggested that these references have diminished import because Congress,
while initially debating the inclusion of this express limitation in the statutory language
itself, ultimately decided to enact the statute without this restriction. Id. at 958-59.
Seven judges dissented from the majority opinion. In an opinion filed by Politz, Circuit
Judge, the dissenters built their case for a more restrictive forfeiture clause on the basic
premise that, historically, the law abhors a forfeiture. Id. at 962 (Politz, J., dissenting). The
dissent maintained that the objective of RICO was "to place a protective mantle of the
federal cirminal law around legitimate businesses, guarding them from the corruption inherent in soiled funds." Id. at 963. Flowing from this objective, the dissenters reasoned that
forfeiture would logically apply to interests in businesses or enterprises. The dissenters also
examined RICO legislative history and unlike the majority, found the references to limiting
forfeitures to interests in an enterprise more persuasive. Finally, the opinion raised the
question of whether a pure monetary forfeiture was essentially a latent fine with a potential
for exceeding the maximum statutorily stated limit of $25,000. Id. at 965.
The conflict over the scope of forfeiture is currently ripe for resolution by either legislative amendment to the statute itself or Supreme Court interpretation of the statute. Because Congress is aware of the ambiguity posed by the existing statute, see infra note 140,
and a writ of certiorari has not been filed by any of the parties in Martino to date, the issue
will most likely be resolved by legislative rather than judicial mandate.
96. See supra note 29.
97. But see Taylor, supra note 57, at 391-92, where the author discussed the problem of
defining an interest in an enterprise which is described as an association in fact. "One cannot own a legal interest in an association in fact." Id. Mr. Taylor noted, however, that Congress was aware of this problem when the RICO statute was drafted. He concluded, therefore, that enterprises which 'are associations in fact were not meant by Congress to be
subject to forfeiture. In addition, he commented that some courts might attempt to avoid
this obstacle by calling the assets a defendant contributes to the association an "interest,"
but criticized this approach as "not what Congress had in mind." Id.
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the decision in Marubeni to limit forfeitures to interests in an enterprise, 8 it is clear that the decision has fostered results inconsistent with the broad legislative purpose of RICO. Given the recent
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Turkette,"9 where Justice White expressed concern that a narrow construction of RICO
would place whole areas of organized criminal activity beyond the
reach of the statute,100 the outcome dictated by the Marubeni construction of the forfeiture provision appears wholly inapposite to
the Court's policy of liberal construction. Borrowing the Court's
reasoning in Turkette, a limitation of the forfeiture provision to
"interests in an enterprise" would place whole areas of organized
criminal activity beyond the reach of the provision. Congress undoubtedly did not intend to enact a forfeiture provision which
could not reach some of the most insidious organized crime activities. These activities include narcotics trafficking, arson, prostitution and murder-for-hire, all of which would operate in enterprises
of persons associated in fact and all of which would not contain
conventional channels for maintaining an interest.
Consecutive Sentencing
Although the key penalty under RICO is forfeiture, the statute
also provides for imposition of a fine not to exceed $25,000 and/or
a term of imprisonment not to exceed twenty years for the violation of each of its provisions. 101 The issuance of consecutive prison
sentences upon conviction for RICO and other state and federal
crimes has been attacked as violative of both the fifth amendment
guarantee against double jeopardy 0' and the eighth amendment
ban on cruel and unusual punishment.' s
Double Jeopardy
The double jeopardy clause "protects against multiple punishments for the same offense."' ' Racketeering defendants have
98. See infra text accompanying notes 138 & 139.
99. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
100. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976). For the full text of the penalties provision, see supra text
accompanying note 56.
102. U.S. CONsT. amend. V states in part. "nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. ..."
103. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII states in part: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
104. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
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raised the argument that the imposition of consecutive sentences
under RICO constitutes multiple punishments in violation of this
clause. The double jeopardy argument has been raised in three
ways. First, where a defendant is convicted of the RICO substantive offense of racketeering' 5 and two or more state and/or federal
crimes,1 the defendant may assert that the imposition of consecutive sentences constitutes multiple punishment. " The gist of this
argument is that, under RICO, conviction and sentencing are predicated upon a finding of guilt in at least two prior offenses; hence,
the defendant, upon receiving the subsequent consecutive RICO
penalty, has received multiple punishment for the same crimes.1 0
Second, where a defendant is convicted of the RICO substantive
offenses of racketeering and of conspiring to racketeer, 1", the defendant may again claim that the imposition of consecutive
sentences constitutes multiple punishment.11 0 This assertion is
based on the prosecution's use of the same evidence to prove both
the conspiracy and the commission of the substantive offense.
Under this argument, the defendant asserts that two crimes undifferentiated by two distinct burdens of proof should not result in
two separate punishments.
Finally, where a defendant is convicted of conspiring to racketeer and is convicted of conspiring under the general federal conspiracy statute,"1 the defendant may contend that the imposition
of consecutive sentences constitutes multiple punishment.1 This
contention is supported by the fact that there is often only one
agreement between the co-conspirators and, therefore, only one
105. See supra note 20.
106. See supra note 23.
107. See United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1980).
108. Id. at 360.
109. See supra note 20.
110. See United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Hawkins, 516 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (M.D. Ga. 1981). See also Iannelli v. United States 420
U.S. 770, 789 (1975) (imposition of consecutive sentences falls within sound discretion of the
trial judge).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). The statute provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire... to commit any offense against the United
States... and one or more such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
112. See United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 234-38 (2d Cir. 1981). See also United
States v. Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (where the court held that if an
indictment does not mention whether the defendant is charged with conspiracy under the
general conspiracy statute or with conspiracy under RICO, then the court will be required to
impose a sentence under the statute providing the least severe punishment).
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conspiracy.
The courts facing these arguments have held that consecutive
sentences under the RICO statute are permissible and do not violate the double jeopardy clause.11 The determinative factor in the
courts' decisions has been that the punishments imposed are not
for the same offense. In reaching their decisions, the courts have
relied heavily on Supreme Court precedent in analogous double
jeopardy cases.
In Blockburger v. United States,' 4 the Supreme Court developed the seminal test used by the lower courts in determining
when multiple proof is necessary. The Court declared that "where
the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision re' 5
quires proof of a fact which the other does not." 1
Applying this test, the lower courts have found that the RICO
substantive offense requires proof of a fact which the predicate offenses and the RICO conspiracy offense do not. That is, the proof
of a RICO substantive offense requires the showing of a "pattern
of racketeering.""' Neither the predicate offenses nor the RICO
conspiracy offense require such a showing. Thus, consecutive
sentences between the RICO conspiracy offense, the RICO substantive offense and the predicate offenses which form the RICO
offense are not multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy.
The Blockburger test cannot be applied as easily to a situation
where the defendant has been charged with violating the RICO
conspiracy statute and the general federal conspiracy statute. For
example, in United States v. Barton,"7 the defendants were convicted of conspiring to racketeer under RICO, and of conspiring to
possess explosives and to maliciously damage buildings under the
general federal conspiracy statute." 8 All the defendants had entered into one agreement in furtherance of their plan to gain control of gambling and other unlawful enterprises. On the surface, it
appears that if both conspiracies were based on the same agree-

113. But see Bradley, supra note 16, at 855-56. The author makes an argument that
RICO does violate the double jeopardy clause.
114. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
115. Id. at 304.
116. See United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 572 (9th Cir. 1979).
117. 647 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1981).
118. Id. at 227. See supra note 23.
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ment, they constituted only one offense since proof of an agreement is the essence of the crime of conspiracy. 1 " "
The court in Barton, however, distinguished the conspiracies as
separate offenses and held that consecutive sentences were permissible and not violative of the double jeopardy clause. 2 0 The court
reached its decision by applying the reasoning of two recent Supreme Court opinions which construed the Blockburger test. In
Whalen v. United States,"2 the Court held that consecutive
sentences for the conviction of two statutory offenses is permissible
if Congress intended to allow cumulative sentences when it enacted the statutes. In addition, the Court found that the "different
fact" requirement of Blockburger must be met. Then, in Albernaz
v. United States,122 the Court held that consecutive sentences may
be imposed for violations of two distinct conspiracy statutes which
proscribe two different outcomes, notwithstanding that the defendants entered into only one agreement. Where the statutory provisions specify different ends as the proscribed object of the conspiracy, the Blockburger test is satisfied, according to the Albernaz
Court, because the different outcomes require proof of different
facts. 23
Reading Whalen and Albernaz together, the Barton court distinguished the RICO conspiracy, where the proscribed outcome
was racketeering, from the conspiracy under the general conspiracy
statute, where the outcome was possession of explosives and damaging buildings. One conspiracy required proof that the objective
was racketeering and the other required proof that the objective
was to possess explosives and to damage buildings. The court also
concluded from a reading of RICO legislative history that Congress
intended to permit cumulative punishments for violation of the
RICO conspiracy provision in relation to all pre-existing federal
statutes for the purpose of creating enhanced sanctions."'
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Defendants have also claimed that consecutive sentencing under
RICO is excessive and therefore constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The imposition of consecutive sentences for the RICO
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942).
United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 238 (2d Cir. 1981).
445 U.S. 684 (1980).
450 U.S. 333 (1981).
Id. at 336, 343.
United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 238 (2d Cir. 1981).
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substantive offense and the underlying predicate offenses has been
unanimously held as not violative of the eighth amendment and in
keeping with Congress's scheme to create enhanced sanctions for
convicted racketeers. 125 On the other hand, consecutive sentences
following convictions for the RICO conspiracy offense and the
RICO substantive offense, while held to be constitutional, have not
received universal acceptance. Although the vast majority of courts
have held that consecutive sentences for the two RICO offenses is
permissible, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Sutton ' 6 held
that the convictions for the two offenses must merge at sentencing.
The Sutton court, however, provided little explanation for its deci127
sion and has been criticized in subsequent decisions.
Constitutional challenges to consecutive sentencing under RICO,
then, have not had great impact on the effective use of the sanction since judges have considerable latitude in deciding to sentence
consecutively or concurrently. Such discretion permits a judge to
order that sentences be served concurrently when he perceives the
imposition of a string of consecutive sentences as unfair or
counterproductive. Likewise, a judge may sentence consecutively
1 28
for the purpose of enhancing sentences in appropriate situations.
ANALYSIS

The primary theme running through the cases construing the
provisions of RICO is judicial deference to Congress's determined
attack on organized crime.1 29 A secondary theme is judicial concern
125. See United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1981), which held that "Congress may constitutionally make the commission of two crimes within a specified period of
time and within the course of a particular type of enterprise an independent criminal offense punishable more severly [sic] than simply twice the penalty for each constituent offense." Id. at 413.
See also United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1980) (eighth amendment
challenge to sentence was "frivolous"); and United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.
1979) (court has discretion to impose suitable penalty).
126. 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980). The defendant in United States v. Hill, 646 F.2d 247
(6th Cir. 1981) succeeded in severing his trial from the mammoth Sutton case. The court in
Hill adopted the Sutton approach to sentencing and gave defendant Hill concurrent
sentences.
127. See United States v. Hawkins, 516 F. Supp. 1204, 1207-08 (M.D. Ga. 1981). Because
Sutton is one of the best known RICO cases to date, the court's decision to merge the RICO
offenses for purposes of sentencing accompanied with little explanation is disconcerting.
128. The Court in Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975), commented that a
judge's decision to sentence consecutively "fall[s) within the sound discretion of each, and
should be rendered in accordance with the facts and circumstances of a particular case." Id.
at 791.
129. See generally United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981); United States v. Sut-
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over permitting too much prosecutorial discretion in the use of
RICO given the Act's broad reach and severe sanctions.1 30 As the
two themes have intertwined, the courts, with one prominent exception," 1 have lent wide support to the aims of RICO." 2
Beginning with the cases which preceded United States v.
Turkette,"' the courts had accepted the government's assertion
that a broadly construed statute was necessary"" to wage war on
organized crime due to the increasing sophistication of the organization's activities.'
A more narrowly construed statute would result in members of organized crime finding new loopholes to avoid
prosecution under the statute. In Turkette, the Supreme Court responded to this reasoning when it broadly construed the term "enterprise" as encompassing both legitimate and illegitimate entities.
The liberal attitude of the Court in construing the application of
RICO has logically influenced the contruction of the penalty provisions of the Act as well. The resulting combination of liberal construction, mandatory forfeiture, and consecutive sentencing creates
a powerful arsenal in the hands of the prosecutor. The government
may now prosecute racketeers under a very broad statute, the violation of which exposes a defendant to harsh penalties. In the
spirit of Turkette, courts seem to have limited their own discretion
in RICO cases in exchange for greater discretion by the government in choosing prosecutions wisely and selecting defendants who
clearly were the targets of the 1970 Act. Such prosecutorial discretion could easily lead to abuse where the government uses the Act

ton 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir, 1979);
United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hawkins v. United
States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
130. See supra note 44. See also infra note 136.
131. The Ninth Circuit's narrow construction of the forfeiture provision, which permits
only forfeiture of an interest in an enterprise and not of the proceeds and profits, drastically
curtails the effectiveness of the provision. See United States v. Marubeni America Corp.,
611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980) and text accompanying notes 83-101 supra.
132. See supra notes 38 & 128.
133. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
134. The courts also have noted that § 904 of RICO (title IX) specifically states that
"the provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes
...
P.L. 91-452,
. § 904, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4036. See also United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).

135. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSMCE,
TASK FORCE REPORr. ORGANIZED CRIME (1967). See also Mitchell, supra note 17, at 44,
where the author quotes a comment of Brian Murtagh's (see supra note 28), that organized
crime has become "a lot smarter with their money. They're using offshore banks, 'funny
banks' within the U.S. - laundering [money] has gotten a lot more sophisticated."
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to prosecute defendants who, because of the wide reach of the statute, technically fall within its ambit even though Congress had not
targeted them for the special RICO sanctions.1 36 During the last
year, however, the Justice Department has curtailed its approval of
RICO prosecutions, which may indicate3 7 a trend toward greater selectivity in naming RICO defendants.

Among the cases which might be criticized as demonstrating a
lack of prosecutorial discretion under RICO is United States v.
Marubeni. s8 The racketeers in Marubeni were not members of organized crime but were managers of a corporation who sought to
obtain contracts by bribing a public official. In limiting forfeitures
to an "interest in an enterprise" and holding that the profits and
proceeds of a racketeering enterprise were not forfeitable interests
under the Act, the court may have been expressing concern that
the defendant cable manufacturers were not proper RICO
defendants."13

The court also may have been reacting to the government's overbroad interpretation of the RICO forfeiture provision, which had
construed forfeitable interest as "any form of income or proceeds."
If the court had accepted the government's definition of "interest,"
the defendants would have had to forfeit all the proceeds earned
from the performance of the contracts. This forfeiture would seem136. The Second Circuit expressed its concern in observing that "the potentially broad
reach of RICO poses a special danger of abuse where a prosecutor attempts to apply the
statute to situations for which it was not primarily intended. Therefore, we caution against
undue prosecutorial zeal in invoking RICO." United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 395-96
(2d Cir. 1979). For a thorough discussion of the problems surrounding potential abuse of

RICO, see Note, United States v. Sutton: the Sixth Circuit Curbs Abuse of RICO, the
Federal Racketeering Statute, 28 CLEVE. ST. L. Rav. 629, 653-65 (1979).
137. According to the Murtagh interview, supra note 28, the Justice Department has
authorized only 55-60 prosecutions during the last year.
138. 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980). See supra text accompanying notes 82-93.
139. This concern over having "proper" RICO defendants before the court was recently
voiced in a civil RICO case. In Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527
F. Supp. 256 (E.D. La. 1981), a products liability case, the plaintiff steamship companies
charged that the defendant contractors and manufacturers of engine couplings for oceangoing vessels engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, mail fraud and wire fraud in
failing to recall or advise shippers of allegedly defective couplings. The judge dismissed the
RICO counts, opining that
Congress' overriding intent in drafting RICO in such broad terms was to provide
an effective mechanism for eradicating organized crime from the social fabric
....
I conclude that the history of the statute reveals a clearly expressed legislative intent that RICO should apply only to actions involving organized crime activities and not to everyday civil actions like those in this proceeding, involving
private litigants with no relation to organized crime (footnote omitted).
Id. at 260.
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ingly include not only the profits from the contracts, but also the
cost of performing the contracts. Sanctioning the corporations in
this manner would injure innocent employees of the corporation
since payments for the work performed by these employees would
be included in the gross proceeds subject to forfeiture. The court
may have anticipated the consequences of such a broad forfeiture
order when it denied the forfeiture. Had the government been
more sensitive to the commingling of the illegitimate and legitimate aspects of the performance of the contracts and asked only
for the forfeiture of profits, the court may have acquiesced. Instead, the government persisted in its argument, and the court
consequently set the only major precedent which serves to limit
the scope of the RICO Act. The Marubeni decision, ironically,
touches on an issue most critical to the success of RICO: the objects of forfeiture. If the government cannot demand forfeiture of
the profits of organized crime, then the forfeiture provision loses
its effectiveness.
The unsatisfactory results of Marubeni should encourage future
courts to limit that case to its own facts and construe the forfeiture
provision liberally, consistent with judicial interpretation of the remainder of the RICO statute.
Perhaps the most effective way to free the forfeiture provision
from Marubeni would be to amend the forfeiture provision to specifically provide for the forfeiture of profits derived from racketeering activity. 140 A forfeiture provision which encompasses profits of
illegal activities already exists for those engaged in "continuing
criminal enterprises" pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2)(A). 4 1 Since
a wholly illegitimate enterprise under RICO is akin to the notion
of a continuing criminal enterprise, such an amendment would be
consistent with congressional intent to remove profits from these
types of enterprises. Where the RICO enterprise is a legitimate

140. The Criminal Justice Newsletter (a publication of the National Council on Crime &
Delinquency) Vol. 12, No. 22, Nov. 9, 1981, reported that Attorney General William French
Smith presented a 17-point anti-crime program at an Oct. 23, 1981 hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Law. Point 17 proposes new legislation that will provide,
inter alia, "specific authority for the forfeiture of the proceeds of an enterprise acquired or
maintained in violation" of RICO. According to Attorney General Smith, the Justice Department is currently drafting the legislation.
141. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, passed by the
same Congress in the same month as RICO, also provides for criminal forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. §
848(a)(2) (1976) states in pertinent part: "Any person who is convicted under paragraph (1)
of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise shall forfeit to the United States - (A) the
profits obtained by him in such enterprise.. ." (emphasis added).
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one, the forfeiture of illegal profits distilled from the gross proceeds of the enterprise would not constitute an inequitable result.
CONCLUSION

Congress enacted RICO as part of a calculated effort to curb the
growth of organized crime. Recognizing the unconventional business practices of organized crime members and desiring to bring
them to an end, Congress resorted to unconventional methods. One
such tactic was the creation of a substantive offense which consists
of a violation of two pre-existing state or federal laws. Another was
the introduction of in personam criminal forfeiture. In addition to
forfeiture, RICO defendants were subjected to the possibility of
serving consecutive sentences for all the underlying crimes.
Liberal construction and severe sanctions have made RICO a
formidable weapon. Thus far, the courts have been generally sympathetic to the government's need for such a weapon and have implemented the legislative intent of the Act. Given the chameleonlike character of organized crime, the government requires a remedial statute which is wide-reaching and backed by enhanced penalty provisions. These same features, however, render RICO susceptible to misuse, since under a broad construction of the Act any
two offenses can be linked to form a RICO violation. So long as the
government judiciously selects and approves its RICO prosecutions, the courts will adhere to the liberal construction of the Act
as provided in Turkette. If not, inequities will result, and the
courts will turn hostile and attempt to limit the application of the
RICO provision. If this occurs, an essential component in the government's fight against organized crime will have been needlessly
lost. " 2
REGINA KWAN PETERSON

142. As one commentator has colorfully stated, the government must exercise its
prosecutorial discretion wisely or it will inadvertently "kill the goose that potentially can lay
for you a golden egg." Blakey, Materials on RICO: Criminal Overview, in 1 CORNELL INSTITUTE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, TECHNIQUES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME

33-34 (1980).

